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Constitutional (mis)Adventures: 
revisiting Quebec’s proposed  
Charter of Values 
Dia Dabby 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Charter affirming the values of State secularism and religious 
neutrality and of equality between women and men, and providing a 
framework for accommodation requests 1  was introduced by the Parti 
Québécois (“PQ”) in November 2013, amid months of speculation and 
anticipation. According to then Premier Pauline Marois, Bill 60 would be 
similar in scope to the Charter of the French Language,2 and likely be 
cited for years to come as a “rallying project” for all Quebecers.3 Bernard 
Drainville, author of the bill and Minister responsible for Democratic 
Institutions and Active Citizenship, presented Bill 60 as a real milestone 
in Quebec’s history: “these values, like our language, are our cement 
[…]. We believe that once adopted, this charter will be a source of 
                                                                                                                       
 Assistant Professor, Department of Child Law, Leiden University. D.C.L. (McGill, 2016 
(expected)), SSHRC Joseph-Armand Bombardier CGS Doctoral Scholar (2012-2015), LL.M. 
(Université de Montréal, 2010), LL.B. (Université de Montréal, 2005), B.A. (McGill, 2002). This 
article was first presented at Osgoode Hall’s 18th Annual Constitutional Case Conference (held 
April 10, 2015). Thank you to conference organizers, Professors Sonia Lawrence and Benjamin 
Berger, for inviting me to present this article. I am indebted to Amélie Barras, Howard Kislowicz, 
David Sandomierski, Lori Beaman, Colleen Sheppard and Sonia Lawrence for their invaluable 
comments, as well as those of two anonymous reviewers. Special thanks to Adam Sargon for his 
love and support. Any errors remain mine alone. 
1 Bill 60, Charter affirming the values of State secularism and religious neutrality and of 
equality between women and men, and providing a framework for accommodation requests, 1st 
sess., 40th Leg., Quebec, 2013 [hereinafter “Bill 60”]. 
2 Charter of the French Language, CQLR, c. C-11 [hereinafter “Charter of the French 
Language”]. 
3 Robert Dutrisac « Charte des valeurs — Le PQ durcit sa position » Le Devoir (8 novembre 
2013) online: <http://www.ledevoir.com/politique/quebec/392166/le-pq-durcit-sa-position>. 
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harmony and cohesion for Quebec.” 4  Language and values became 
legislatively intertwined through Bill 60’s larger social project, vested 
with the same power and social significance.  
However, Bill 60 did not achieve the intended consensus, or even the 
status of law, because a provincial election was called — and 
subsequently lost — by the PQ minority government on April 7, 2014.5 
This article argues, nevertheless, that Bill 60 has left an indelible mark 
on Quebec society: it has raised foundational questions about the make-
up of Quebec society as well its chosen model of, and vehicle for, 
integration. Moreover, the divided positions over Bill 60 reveal that this 
legislative project was much more than a simple law, and rather, as 
argued in this article, about reconfiguring the constitutional relationship 
that Quebecers entertain with the rest of Canada (“RoC”). 
In the absence of litigated cases resulting from Bill 60’s actual 
enactment into law,6 this article seeks to engage with the constitutional 
“misadventures” experienced in 2013-2014. By “constitutional”, I refer 
to Bill 60 — albeit a (potential) piece of provincial legislation — having 
the power to reshape the basic social contract that Quebecers have with 
the rest of Canada. I argue that Bill 60 was a constitutional intervention 
by another name. By “misadventures”, I borrow from the old French 
origin of this word, mesaventure, or, “to turn out badly”.7  
This article draws on briefs submitted to the Commission des 
institutions before the National Assembly and the official report of 
debates, as well as relevant academic commentary and case law. In Part II, 
I offer a critical snapshot of Bill 60 in order to understand its scope and 
its potential implications on a constitutional level. This also includes a 
background to Bill 60, in terms of past confrontations with religious 
reasonable accommodation in Quebec. I also argue that while a number 
                                                                                                                       
4 Id. [translated by author]. Original, in French: « ces valeurs, comme notre langue, sont 
notre ciment […]. Nous avons la conviction qu’une fois adoptée, cette charte sera source d’harmonie 
et de cohésion pour le Québec ». 
5 Tim Duboyce, “Quebec election 2014: Pauline Marois loses electoral Hail Mary” CBC 
(April 8, 2014), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/quebec-votes-2014/quebec-election-
2014-pauline-marois-loses-electoral-hail-mary-1.2601935>. 
6 The federal government cautioned against a possible legal challenge if the proposed 
charter of values was enacted into law: Mark Kennedy & Tobi Cohen, “Harper government warns of 
possible legal challenge to Quebec’s proposed values charter”, National Post ( September 10, 2013) 
online: <http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-politics/harper-government-warns-of-
possible-legal-challenge-to-quebecs-proposed-values-charter#__federated=1>. 
7 “misadventure, n.” in OED Online (Oxford University Press, September 2015) online: 
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/119151?rskey=EHw9Lt&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid>. 
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of litigated cases about freedom of religion and reasonable 
accommodation have emerged from the Quebec context, one case in 
particular, Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys,8 has 
come to symbolize a schism in how religious accommodation is 
addressed in Quebec. By way of conclusion, this article suggests that 
Quebec’s constructed role as “outlier” to the RoC, especially in regards 
to religious reasonable accommodation, is not really as different as is 
supposed, particularly in light of recent litigation in the rest of Canada. 
Ultimately, this article devotes more careful elaboration to 
accommodation, as conceived in Bill 60, how this would alter the 
meaning of accommodation under the Quebec Charter,9 and the resulting 
tension with the Canadian Charter.10 
II. BILL 60: AN “EVERYTHING BUT THE KITCHEN SINK”  
APPROACH TO LAW MAKING 
This section explains and critiques Bill 60. Ultimately, Bill 60 
reshaped how public services were to be given and received — and 
consequently, the public face of the State. It unequivocally regulated how 
certain members of society (predominantly aimed at observant Muslims, 
Jews, Sikhs and other religious minorities, as well as the rare practising 
Catholic) could interact and engage with others in the public sphere, in 
the context of giving and receiving public services. In so doing, I suggest 
that Bill 60 legitimated a form of legislative “othering”.  
Structurally speaking, Bill 60 was drafted under 12 different 
headings.11  Chapter I focused on the relationship between religious 
neutrality and the secular nature of public bodies (ss. 1-2); Chapter II set 
out the duties of neutrality in the context of public bodies (and their 
employees), as well as restricted the types of religious symbols that can 
be worn by personnel members of public bodies (ss. 3-5); Chapter III 
addressed the obligation of having uncovered faces, both in the offering 
and receiving of public services (ss. 6-7); beyond the personnel members of 
public bodies, Chapter IV identified the other persons targeted by Bill 60 
                                                                                                                       
8 [2006] S.C.J. No. 6, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Multani”]. 
9 Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, CQLR, c. C-12 [hereinafter “Quebec Charter”]. 
10 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
11 Bill 60, supra, note 1. 
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(ss. 8-14); Chapter V established how accommodation of religious 
requests would be handled, as well as the limits of these accommodation 
requests (ss. 15-18); Chapter VI articulated the implementation policies 
that each public body is expected to adopt, in order to put Bill 60 into 
practice. Particular rules are set out for the daycare setting (Chapters VII 
and VIII, ss. 27-32). Bill 60 also set out broad discretionary powers to 
the Minister responsible for this bill, in terms of its application and 
promotion (Chapter IX, ss. 33-35). Similar powers are also set out for the 
Government (Chapter X, ss. 36-37). As such, Bill 60 would modify 
important pieces of existing legislation, including the Quebec Charter, 
the Educational Childcare Act12  and the Act Respecting the National 
Assembly13  (Chapter XI, ss. 38-43). The final Chapter articulates the 
transitory measures (ss. 42-55). Given the broad scope of Bill 60, my 
comments will focus on the nature of public bodies and their personnel 
members, as well as the provisions on accommodation measures.  
Having set out Bill 60’s structure, the points raised in this Part speak 
both to legislative form and substance and address four areas: (1) 
theoretical framing; (2) re-defining vivre-ensemble; (3) scope and (4) 
accommodation frameworks. Building on this discussion, this section 
suggests that the content and structure of Bill 60 reinforced the narrative 
of a new social contract — that of a secular (sovereign) state.  
1. Framing Secularism 
This article suggests that a framework for thinking about secularism 
is first desirable, in order to unpack Bill 60, within the context of 
Quebec. This article draws on the works of Talal Asad14 and Elizabeth 
Shakman Hurd to inform our understanding of Bill 60’s approach to 
secularism. Indeed, Hurd understands secularism as a societal project, 
not sequentially but deeply interdependent: “[s]ecularism is not the 
absence of religion, but enacts a particular kind of presence. It appropriates 
religion: defining, shaping and even transforming it.”15 Viewed through 
this lens, Bill 60 emerges first and foremost as a political project, seeking 
                                                                                                                       
12 Educational Childcare Act, CQLR, c. S-4.1.1. 
13 Act Respecting the National Assembly, CQLR, c. A-23.1. 
14 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2003). 
15 Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, “International politics after secularism” (2012) 38 Review of 
International Studies 943, at 955. 
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to alter the place that religion occupies in Quebec society. I argue that in 
reconfiguring the place of religion, this legislative project also sought to 
re-define the place that Quebec occupies in Canada through its 
amendments to Quebec’s Charter.16 More broadly, Bill 60’s legislative 
refashioning substantively disconnected Quebecers from the promise of 
Canadian unity and the protections under the Charter, 17  as addressed 
further on in this article. 
In returning to the place of religion in this discussion, I draw on 
Hurd’s suggestion that it does not disappear, but rather, is reshaped. Within 
Quebec’s context, immigration and education policies have led the way in 
(re)shaping how and under what circumstances we engage with cultural 
and religious diversity and artifacts. This resonates particularly within 
Quebec’s “common civic framework”,18 often referred to as vivre-ensemble, 
which has been developed through a variety of legislative policies  
since the early 1990s. As noted by then Quebec Ministry of Cultural 
Communities and Immigration (now Ministry of Immigration, Diversity 
and Inclusion),  
Living together is more than sharing the same institutions and 
interacting in official or functional situations. It’s also feeling united by 
a shared sentiment of belonging to a common society and an 
acceptance to build tomorrow’s society, enriched by each individual’s 
contribution.19 
At that time, vivre-ensemble was identified as a moral contract 20 
between citizens and the State. This concept has evolved in Quebec over 
the last quarter century,21 revolving increasingly around the management 
                                                                                                                       
16 Supra, note 9. 
17 Supra, note 10. 
18 Gérard Bouchard & Charles Taylor, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation (Quebec 
City: Government of Quebec, 2008), online: <https://www.mce.gouv.qc.ca/publications/CCPARDC/ 
rapport-final-integral-en.pdf>, at 105 [hereinafter “Bouchard & Taylor, ‘Building the Future’”]. 
19 Direction des communication du ministère des communautés culturelles et de l’Immigration du 
Québec, Au Québec pour bâtir ensemble: énoncé de politique en matière d’immigration et d’intégration 
(1991), online: <http://www.midi.gouv.qc.ca/publications/fr/ministere/Enonce-politique-immigration-
integration-Quebec1991.pdf>, at 88 [translated by author]. Original, in French: « Vivre ensemble, c’est 
plus que partager les mêmes institutions et interagir dans des situations officielles ou fonctionnelles. C’est 
aussi se sentir unis par un sentiment d’appartenance à une société commune et accepter de construire la 
société de demain que l’apport de chacun enrichira. » 
20 Id., 16. 
21 See, for instance: Ministry of Education Québec, Religion in Secular Schools: A New 
Perspective, online: <http://collections.banq.qc.ca/ark:/52327/bs40899>; Conseil des relations 
interculturelles Québec, Avis sur la prise en compte et la gestion de la diversité ethnoculturelle 
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of religious diversity.22 Later consultative works have translated “vivre-
ensemble” to “regulat[ing] cohabitation”,23 which speaks to a more structured 
(and structuring) relationship between individuals.  
Asad reminds us that the project of secularism is also social, modified 
not only by a particular lived religious history, but also, by ongoing changes 
in its religious demographics.24 In the context of Quebec, this resonates on 
two different registers: first, in Quebec’s choice of immigrants,25  and 
second, in a shift in religious demographics. Over half of immigrants to 
Quebec in 2013 have a self-declared knowledge of the French language; 
this percentage is over two-thirds if considering the subcategory of skilled 
workers.26 It should be noted that within this context, Quebec selects its 
own economic immigrants, but not its refugees or family class. In 2013, 
34.8 per cent of immigrants to Quebec were from Africa (16.6 per cent 
from North Africa), 26.7 per cent from Asia (including the Middle East), 
21.4 per cent from the Americas and 17 per cent from Europe.27 Although 
the immigrant population comes to Quebec with generally higher language 
skills than previously, there has also been an increase in immigrants with a 
declared religion to this province in recent decades. According to the 2011 
                                                                                                                       
(Québec, Bibliothèque et archives nationales du Québec, 2007), online: <http://www.micc.gouv. 
qc.ca/publications/fr/cri/diversite/Avis-prise-compte-gestion-diversite.pdf>; Ministère de l’éducation, loisir 
et le sport, Comité consultatif sur l’intégration et l’accommodement raisonnable en milieu scolaire: 
une école québécoise inclusive: dialogue, valeurs et repères communs (Québec, 2007), online: 
<http://www.education.gouv.qc.ca/fileadmin/site_web/documents/dpse/formation_jeunes/RapportAc
cRaisonnable. pdf>. 
22 See Myriam Jézéquel, « Les enjeux de la formation aux compétences interculturelles 
pour l’accommodement des différences dans les services publics » in Conseil de l’Europe, 
Accommodements institutionnels et citoyens : cadres juridiques et politiques pour interagir dans les 
sociétés plurielles (Strasbourg : Éditions du Conseil de l’Europe, 2009) 319, at 319 (fn 3). See also 
Bouchard & Taylor, Building the Future, supra, note 18, at 105. 
23 Bouchard & Taylor, Building the Future, supra, note 18, at 105. See also at 135: 
“cohabitation cannot be supported by a secular equivalent of a religious doctrine but by means of the 
array of values and principles subject to an overlapping consensus. Reliance on common public 
values is intended to ensure the equal dignity of citizens in such a way that they can all adhere to the 
State’s key orientations according to their own conception of the world and of good.” 
24 Asad, supra, note 14, as cited in Valerie Stoker, “Zero Tolerance? Sikh Swords, School 
Safety, and Secularism in Québec” (2007) 75 Journal of the American Academy of Religion 814, at 
816 [hereinafter “Stoker, ‘Zero Tolerance’”]. 
25 Canada-Québec Accord Relating to Immigration and Temporary Admission of Aliens 
(February 5, 1991); British North America Act (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 95 [hereinafter 
“Constitution Act 1867”]. 
26 Immigration, Diversité et Inclusion Québec, « Fiche synthèse sur l’immigration et la 
diversité ethnoculturelle au Québec » (2013), online: <http://www.midi.gouv.qc.ca/publications/fr/ 
recherches-statistiques/FICHE_syn_an2013.pdf>, at 1. 
27 Id. 
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National Household Survey, there is a notable increase in the number  
of immigrants to Quebec with a declared religion between 1991-2000  
(195 920) and 2001-2011 (380 830).28 In my view, and drawing on Hurd’s 
insights, demographic shifts, such as the ones noted, can sit uneasily with 
Quebec’s sustained efforts at deconfessionalization29  and other recent 
legislative projects30 aimed at reshaping the secular narrative.  
The shift in religious demographics in Quebec can be further 
evidenced through Bill 60’s aggressive $1.9 million media campaign,31 
seeking once again to challenge religious practices and illustrations 
thereof. Bill 60’s media campaign relied heavily on the use of religiously 
textured language, notably sacré (or sacred), which was emblazoned in 
full-sized ads found in flyers, newspapers, online as well as metro stations. 
The Bible, Koran and Torah were “sacred”, to the same degree as gender 
equality and religious neutrality of the State.32 Reliance on the discourse of 
the “sacred” in this context hints that it is “now part of the discourse 
integral to functions and aspirations of the modern, secular state, in which 
the sacralization of individual citizen and collective people expresses a 
form of naturalized power”.33 This was also expressed through a controlled 
                                                                                                                       
28 Statistics Canada, 2011 National Household Survey: Data tables (Cat. 99-010-
X2011032), online: <https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/dp-pd/dt-td/index-eng.cfm>. 
29 Supra, note 21, as well as: Ministère de l’éducation, loisir et le sport, Comité consultatif 
sur l’intégration et l’accommodement raisonnable en milieu scolaire: une école québécoise 
inclusive: dialogue, valeurs et repères communs, supra, note 21; Constitution Amendment, 1997 
(Quebec), SI/97-141); Stoker, “Zero Tolerance”, supra, note 24, at 816. 
30 Most notably: Bill 94, An Act to establish guidelines governing accommodation requests 
within the Administration and certain institutions, 1st sess., 39th Leg., Quebec, 2010 [hereinafter 
“Bill 94”]. 
31 Various media outlets reported the cost of Bill 60’s advertising campaign at $1.9 million, 
comparable in cost to what the Quebec government has spent on the Plan Nord. See Véronique 
Prince, « Exclusif — Charte des valeurs québécoises: Offensive publicitaire de 1,9 millions de 
dollars » TVA nouvelles (September 10, 2013), online: <http://tvanouvelles.ca/lcn/infos/national/ 
archives/2013/09/20130910-115617.html>; « Charte des valeurs: budget publicitaire « comparable » 
au Plan Nord, selon Québec » Ici Radio-Canada (13 September 2013), online: <http://ici.radio-
canada.ca/nouvelles/Politique/2013/09/13/001-budget-charte-plan-nord.shtml>. As a point of 
comparison, the budget for the Bouchard-Taylor Commission (2007-2008) was estimated at 3.7 
million dollars. See Tasha Kheiriddin & Martin Collacott, “Bouchard-Taylor report fails to make the 
grade” (July 2008) Fraser Forum, 14, at 14, retrieved online: <http://search.proquest.com.proxy3. 
library.mcgill.ca/docview/229261657?accountid=12339>. 
32 For image, see: Thomas Déri, «Débat sur les valeurs — Une « sacrée » propagande! » Le 
Devoir (September 21, 2013), online: <http://www.ledevoir.com/politique/quebec/388030/une-
sacree-propagande>. 
33 Asad, supra, note 14, at 32. 
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crowdsourcing of public opinion prior to the unveiling of Bill 60,34 via a 
dedicated (now defunct35) website and phone line to take citizens’ voices 
and opinions into account.36 Substantive “airtime” for citizens’ exposure to 
religious diversity 37  during Bill 60’s public hearings at the National 
Assembly also bolstered this approach to law making; this point will be 
further addressed in the following section (2) of this article. 
Despite its clear framing as a social project — reshaping the contours 
of “religion” in Quebec, in response to its changing religious 
demographics — Bill 60 was put forth without scientific studies38 or 
legal opinions39 buttressing the actual need for, and validity of, such law. 
Insights drawn from both Hurd and Asad, as applied to Quebec’s context, 
                                                                                                                       
34 It should be noted that the PQ did not publicly release the “raw” data, but rather, provided a 
curated compilation of received comments. See: <http://web.archive.org/web/20131114000149/ 
http://www. nosvaleurs.gouv.qc.ca/medias/pdf/tableau_compilation_des_commentaires.pdf> (November 11, 
2013 snapshot). 
35 I accessed the PQ Charter of values website (<www.nosvaleurs.gouv.qc.ca>) via an 
Internet archive website (<http://archive.org/web/>), enabling me to retrieve content that has been 
removed from the active Internet webpages (see notes 33 and 81). 
36 « Charte des valeurs : Drainville satisfait des commentaires, l’opposition s’impatiente »  
Ici Radio-Canada (22 October 2013), online: <http://ici.radio-canada.ca/nouvelles/Politique/ 
2013/10/22/001-charte-valeurs-drainville-synthese-quebec.shtml>. Prior to its unveiling before the 
National Assembly in November 2013, the PQ had released a five-point plan on this project in 
September 2013 via <www.nosvaleurs.gouv.qc.ca> (now defunct), which served as the foundation and 
invitation for citizen involvement. 
37 The case of the Pineault-Caron family in particular, marked Bill 60’s public hearings. 
Geneviève Caron recounted her bewildering experience of entering a mosque in Morocco and watching 
men and women pray, in segregated spaces, “on all fours on a small carpet”. Her husband, Claude 
Pineault, gave a similarly confounding account of his encounter with veiled women in a market in 
Tangiers, then extending his comments to the streets of Montreal. See Quebec, National Assembly, 
Journal des débats, 40th Leg., 1st Sess., Vol. 43 N° 112 (January 16, 2014), at 16h57 (Claude  
Pineault). Their xenophobic comments resulted in strong public condemnation. See, for example: 
Gabrielle Duchaine, Côte-Nord : retour chez les Pineault-Caron » La Presse (March 17 , 2014),  
online: <http://www.lapresse.ca/actualites/dossiers/le-quebec-au-temps-de-la-charte/201403/15/01-
4748084-cote-nord-retour-chez-les-pineault-caron.php>; « Commission sur la charte de laïcité : La 
vidéo de la famille Pineault-Caron devient virale » TVA Nouvelles (January 19, 2014), online: 
<http://tvanouvelles.ca/lcn/infos/national/archives/2014/01/20140119-173842.html>. 
38 The Barreau du Québec was very critical of the lack of scientific studies and impact in law 
in their brief (albeit not presented before the National Assembly, their brief can be found on their 
website): Barreau du Québec, Projet de loi No 60: Charte affirmant les valeurs de la laïcité et de 
neutralité religieuse de l’État ainsi que d’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes et encadrant les 
demandes d’accommodement (December 19, 2013), online: <http://www.barreau.qc.ca/pdf/medias/ 
positions/2014/20140116-pl-60.pdf> [hereinafter « Barreau du Québec, Projet de loi No 60 »]. 
39 The PQ later admitted that no formal legal opinions had officially been requested for  
Bill 60: “Charte des valeurs: le PQ confirme l’absence d’avis juridique formel” Le Devoir May 1, 
2014), online: <http://www.ledevoir.com/politique/quebec/407126/charte-des-valeurs-le-pq-confirme-l-
absence-d-avis-juridique-formel>. 
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suggest on the one hand that secularist projects, like Bill 60 (and 
previous legislative attempts), do not remove religion from the public 
sphere, but simply, provide new contours. On the other, Bill 60 must be 
understood and engaged with in the context of shifting religious 
demographics, both in terms of medium and message. In building on the 
theoretical framing of this social project, the following section engages 
with how vivre-ensemble is conjugated with religious beliefs in Quebec.  
2. Re-defining “Vivre-ensemble” 
There has been a noted increase in the number of litigated cases on 
freedom of religion before the Supreme Court of Canada over the last 
decade. Almost all have originated from Quebec. Some have argued that 
the number of cases is disproportionate in provenance.40 Consider, for 
example: the building of a sukkot and co-property regulations; 41  the 
contestation of municipal zoning by-laws by Jehovah’s Witnesses;42 the 
wearing of a kirpan on school grounds;43  the civil and religious 
obligations related to a get (Jewish divorce);44  the challenges to a 
government program on ethics and religious culture;45 and prayers before 
municipal council.46 These cases have received great media attention in 
Quebec. They have provoked schisms both between courts (resulting in 
the consistent overturning of Quebec Court of Appeal decisions by the 
Supreme Court of Canada) and divisions along the lines of the linguistic 
make-up of the Supreme Court bench.47 Sébastien Grammond refers to 
                                                                                                                       
40 Sujit Choudhry, “Special Issue: Rights Constitutionalism and the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms: Rights Adjudication in a Plurinational State: The Supreme Court of Canada, 
Freedom of Religion, and the Politics of Reasonable Accommodation” (2013) 50 Osgoode Hall L.J. 575,  
at para. 3 [hereinafter, “Choudhry, ‘Special Issue’”]. Choudhry speaks of Multani (supra, note 8),  
and Amselem, Lafontaine, Bruker and Commission scolaire des Chênes (infra, notes 41, 42, 44, 45) in 
this article. 
41 Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Amselem”]. 
42 Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme Lafontaine v. Lafontaine (Village), 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 45, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 650 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lafontaine”]. 
43 Multani, supra, note 8. 
44 Bruker v. Marcovitz, [2007] S.C.J. No. 54, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bruker”]. 
45 L. (S.) v. Commission scolaire des Chênes, [2012] S.C.J. No. 7, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 235 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Commission scolaire des Chênes”]; Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney 
General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 12, 2015 SCC 12 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Loyola”]. 
46 Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City), [2015] S.C.J. No. 16, 2015 SCC 16 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Saguenay”]. 
47 Choudhry, “Special Issue”, supra, note 40, at para. 3. 
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these as “points of divergence”.48 However, while most litigated cases of 
religious freedom in Quebec come from minority religious groups, it 
remains that most requests for religious accommodation come from 
Christian communities.49  This prompts the question of how religious 
accommodations were actually perceived and conceived by Quebecers — 
and what constitutes “unjust” accommodation in this setting.  
This section engages with illustrations of, and challenges to, 
Quebec’s model of vivre-ensemble. I argue that two initially disparate 
documents, namely the Bouchard-Taylor Report and the Multani decision, 
are employed as vehicles for discussing identity politics outside of the 
framing of language, relying instead on the language and politics of 
(religious) accommodation. The Bouchard-Taylor commission, known 
officially as the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices 
Related to Cultural Differences was established in February 2007 by then 
Premier Jean Charest “in response to public discontent concerning 
reasonable accommodation”.50 This section first shows that in framing its 
legislative project, the PQ tied “reasonable accommodation crisis” with the 
Bouchard-Taylor commission, and did so, without referencing the case law 
that has been developed on reasonable accommodation. This PQ strategy, 
which can be understood as self-referential exercise, attempts to insulate 
this model of vivre-ensemble from the broader Canadian context. 
Following this, I argue that while a number of litigated cases about 
freedom of religion and reasonable accommodation have emerged from 
the Quebec context, one case in particular, Multani, has fuelled extensive  
 
                                                                                                                       
48 Choudhry, “Special Issue”, supra, note 40, at para. 3, citing Sébastien Grammond,  
« Conceptions canadienne et québécoise des droits fondamentaux et de la religion: convergence or 
conflit? » (2009) 43(1) R.J.T. 83 [hereinafter “Grammond, ‘Convergence ou conflit’”]. Grammond 
also suggests a split between judges on the basis of religion (Catholic/Protestant split). Given the 
current make-up and religious diversity on the Supreme Court bench, it is not clear from 
Grammond’s analysis where judges who do not fall into either of these categories would fall or align 
themselves (at 97-98). 
49 Commission des droits de la personne et de la jeunesse, Synthèse des résultats. La ferveur 
religieuse et les demandes d’accommodement religieux: une comparaison intergroupe (December 2007) 
(Cat. 2.120-4.21.1), online: <http://www.cdpdj.qc.ca/publications/ferveur_religieuse_synthese.pdf>. 
50 Bouchard & Taylor, Building the Future, supra, note 18, at 17. The Hérouxville code, 
adopted in the early months of 2007, also engendered the creation of the Bouchard-Taylor 
Commission: see Dana Granovsky, “A Time for Reconciliation”?: The Bouchard-Taylor 
Commission and Evolving Democratic Practices in Identity Politics (University of British Columbia, 
Department of Political Science, M.A., 2009), at 8-9. 
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media reporting on religious accommodations and exceptions51 and has 
come to symbolize the estrangement of Quebec politics from Canada’s 
embrace.  
Let us recall that Multani concerned a 12-year old Sikh boy who 
dropped his kirpan, a ceremonial dagger, in his school’s courtyard. An 
administrative controversy arose as to whether the boy would be allowed 
to keep on wearing his kirpan at school. At that time, Gurbaj Singh 
Multani was in a secondary one (grade 7) welcome class for new 
immigrants at École Ste-Catherine Labouré, in LaSalle, a Montreal 
neighbourhood. These classes, known as classes d’accueil, are designed 
to encourage new students to Quebec to integrate into the public school 
system later on, both in terms of French language skills and general 
appreciation of local culture. School authorities worried that the presence 
of a kirpan on school grounds constituted a security concern for other 
students, as well as school personnel.52 The school board (allowing the 
kirpan, under circumstances) and the governing body and council of 
commissioners of that same school board (requiring a symbolic kirpan 
instead) arrived at contradictory decisions. Lower court decisions were 
also divided on the place of the kirpan on school premises: whereas the 
Quebec Superior Court allowed it, following strict conditions, the 
Quebec Court of Appeal decided instead to prioritize safety and security 
concerns over those of individual rights to freedom of religion. Before 
the Supreme Court, it was recognized that religious observances, such as 
the wearing of a kirpan, were included in the right to freedom of 
religion.53 Justice Charron, writing for the majority, noted that the school 
board’s interference with Gurbaj Singh’s freedom of religion was not 
insignificant, forcing him “to choose between leaving his kirpan at home 
and leaving the public school system”.54 For the majority, this was a 
constitutional decision rather than one that should be decided on in 
administrative law terms, as opined by Deschamps and Abella JJ. in their 
concurring opinion.55 Moreover, Charron J. pointed out that a blanket 
prohibition of the kirpan, as asserted by the school board — on the basis 
                                                                                                                       
51 For example, Éric Bélanger, “The 2007 Provincial Election in Quebec” (2008) 2:1 
Canadian Political Science Review 72, at 73. 
52 Multani (tuteur de) c. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2002] J.Q. no 619,  
at para. 6 (Que. S.C.). 
53 Multani, supra, note 8, at paras. 36-39 (Charron J.). 
54 Id., at para. 40 (Charron J.). 
55 Id., at para. 132 (Deschamps and Abella JJ.). 
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that it would lead to an increase in violence on school grounds — is 
“contradicted by the evidence regarding the symbolic nature of the 
kirpan, [and] it is also disrespectful to believers in the Sikh religion and 
does not take into account Canadian values based on multiculturalism”.56  
Multani has been framed as a case where “religion wins”57 and cited 
as an example of successful cross-cultural communication.58 In reference 
to the former, “[s]heathed, sealed, and tucked away inside the folds of 
young Multani’s clothing, religion does not threaten any of the values or 
structural commitments of the rule of law”.59 Letting religious beliefs 
win in Multani, in other words, did not jeopardize the established legal 
order. Religious accommodation in this key, however positive, can also 
perpetuate asymmetrical relations, according to some.60 This portrayal of 
the kirpan, and its strict observance, albeit compelling, represents a 
choice in how to frame this belief for the legal apparatus.61  More 
foundationally, however, Multani propelled the legal community into a 
broader conversation on the intersection of constitutional and 
administrative law values.62  
“L’affaire du kirpan”, as Multani was known in Quebec, also fuelled 
the creation of the Bouchard-Taylor commission, alongside the Hérouxville 
                                                                                                                       
56 Id., at paras. 71, 76 in fine (Charron J.). 
57 Benjamin Berger, “The Cultural Limits of Legal Tolerance” (2008) 21 Can. J.L. & Juris. 
245, at para. 33 [hereinafter “Berger, ‘Cultural Limits’”]. 
58 Howard Kislowicz, “Faithful Translations? Cross-Cultural Communication in Canadian 
Religious Freedom Litigation” (2014) 52 Osgoode Hall L.J. 141, at para. 77 [hereinafter “Kislowicz, 
‘Faithful Translations’”]. 
59 B.L. Berger, “Cultural Limits”, supra, note 57, at para. 33. See also Avigail Eisenberg, 
“Rights in the Age of Identity Politics” (2013) 50 Osgoode Hall L.J. 609 [hereinafter “Eisenberg, 
‘Identity Politics’”]. 
60 Colleen Sheppard, “Inclusion, Voice, and Process-Based Constitutionalism” (2013) 50 
Osgoode Hall L.J. 547, at 572. See also Eisenberg, “Identity Politics”, id., at paras. 15-16 (fn 37). 
61 See, in this way, Howard Kislowicz, “Sacred Laws in Earthly Courts: Legal Pluralism in 
Canadian Religious Freedom Litigation” (2013) 39 Queen’s L.J. 175, at para. 67; Shauna Van 
Praagh, “Open House — ‘Portes ouvertes’: Classrooms as Sites of Interfaith Interface” in B.L. 
Berger & R. Moon, eds., Religion and Public Authority in Canada (London: Hart Publishing 
(forthcoming 2016)). 
62 See in this way, Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, « Quelques angles mort du débat 
sur l’accommodement raisonable à la lumière de la question du port de signes religieux à l’école 
publique : réflexions en forme de points d’interrogation » in Myriam Jézéquel, ed., Les 
accommodements raisonnables. Quoi, comment, jusqu’où ? Des outils pour tous (Cowansville, QC : 
Éditions Yvon Blais, 2007), 241-86; Paul Daly & Angela Cameron, “Furthering Substantive 
Equality through Administrative Law: Charter Values in Education” in B.L. Berger, J. Cameron & 
S. Lawrence, eds. (2013) 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) 169. See also Commission scolaire des Chênes, supra, 
note 45; Doré v. Barreau du Québec, [2012] S.C.J. No. 12, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395 (S.C.C.) and Loyola, 
supra, note 45. 
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Code (the latter crafting a severe code of conduct for immigrants).63  
The Bouchard-Taylor report was produced in May 2008, after a full  
year of public consultations, 13 commissioned research projects,64 and 37 
recommendations. Most pointedly, the report recommended that 
interculturalism, “described as Quebec’s version of the pluralist philosophy, 
just as multiculturalism is its Canadian version […] [be] vigorously 
promote[d]”,65 and a strong argument in favour of open secularism66 as the 
pathway67 forward in Quebec. Some recommendations were rejected out of 
hand, such as the removal of the crucifix behind the speaker at the National 
Assembly.68  Others were pre-empted by initiatives from the National 
Assembly, such as the introduction of gender equality as an interpretive 
clause in the Quebec Charter.69 The great majority of the recommendations, 
much like the report itself, languished after being released — save for 
academic commentary — as though the exercise of consultation was 
enough to relieve the public’s discomfort with religion. Nevertheless, the 
Bouchard-Taylor report found new life, however, as a touchstone for the 
PQ’s Bill 60, some five years after its initial publication. 
The PQ chose to frame Bill 60 through the Bouchard-Taylor report, 
drawing once again on parameters of “public discontent” and “religious 
accommodation”. As such, the PQ dissociated itself from previous 
legislative projects to regulate religious accommodation in the public 
sphere, such as the Quebec Liberals’ (“PLQ”) Bill 94 in 2010, which 
sought to regulate the reception of public services with “uncovered” 
faces.70 This political choice about framing can be interpreted as a result 
                                                                                                                       
63 The Hérouxville Code, adopted in the early months of 2007, also engendered the creation 
of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission: see Dana Granovsky, “A Time for Reconciliation”?: The 
Bouchard-Taylor Commission and Evolving Democratic Practices in Identity Politics (University of 
British Columbia, Department of Political Science, M.A., 2009), at 8-9. 
64 Bouchard & Taylor, Building the Future, supra, note 18, at 35. 
65 Id., note 18, 257. 
66 “[O]pen secularism does not sacrifice the separation of State and Church and State 
neutrality towards religions for the benefit of believers’ freedom of religion. Instead, it offers an 
interpretation that achieves greater compatibility between the two purposes.”: Bouchard & Taylor, 
Building the Future, supra, note 18, at 148. 
67 Lori Beaman, “Battle over symbols: The “religion” of the minority versus the “culture” 
of the majority” (2012-2013) 28 J.L. Religion 67, at 75 [hereinafter “Beaman, ‘Battle over 
symbols’”]. 
68 Quebec, National Assembly, Journal des débats, 38th Leg., 1st Sess., Vol. 40 N° 87 
(May 22, 2008) at 15h10 (Jean Charest). 
69 Bouchard & Taylor, Building the Future, supra, note 18, at 267. Infra, note 133. 
70 Bill 94, supra, note 30. Accommodation was to be granted only under certain conditions. 
Bill 94 was also met with severe criticism. See, for example: Pascale Fournier & Erica See, “The 
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of not finding Bill 94 sufficiently broad in scope, or instead, finding  
the wide-reaching (and somewhat more indeterminate) conclusions 
espoused in the Bouchard-Taylor report more appealing for the PQ’s 
newest rallying project. The Bouchard-Taylor report was also criticized 
for its focus and notably, its lack of external contextualization of 
religious diversity71 — by not referring to the Ontario sharia debate,72 or 
the September 11th attacks — actually served to bolster the PQ’s self-
referential cadre for Bill 60. It found credence in the Bouchard-Taylor 
report, which recommended the adoption of a white paper on secularism, 
to articulate a clear version and policy vision of Quebec’s interculturalist 
model and formalize the “implicit secularis[t] model patiently edified in 
Québec”.73 The Bouchard-Taylor Commission (and report), despite having 
been a creation of the PLQ, enabled the PQ to retain their populist 
“edge”, since “[consultation commissions’] best advantage often lies at 
being exemplars of deliberative democracy in practice”.74 This renewed 
focus on deliberative democracy enabled the PQ to develop their idea(l) 
                                                                                                                       
‘Naked Face’ of Secular Exclusion: Bill 94 and the Privatization of Belief” (2012) 30 Windsor Y.B. 
Access Just. 63; Jennifer Selby, “Un/veiling Women’s Bodies: Secularism and Sexuality in Full-face 
Veil Prohibitions in France and Québec” (2014) Studies in Religion 1; Robert Leckey, “Face to 
Face” (2013) 19 Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture 743; Lori  
G. Beaman, “‘It was all slightly unreal’: What’s Wrong with Tolerance and Accommodation in the 
Adjudication of Religious Freedom?” (2011) 23 C.J.W.L. 442 [hereinafter “Beaman, ‘It was all 
slightly unreal’”]; Vrinda Narain, “Taking the ‘Culture’ out of Multiculturalism” (2014) 26:1 
C.J.W.L. 116 [hereinafter “Narain, ‘Taking the “Culture” out’”]. A private members’ bill was also 
introduced by MNA Fatima Houda-Pépin (then sitting as an independent) in the dying days of the 
2014 legislative session: Bill 491, An Act respecting the religious neutrality of the State and the fight 
against religious fundamentalism and to amend the Charter of human rights and freedoms and the 
Act respecting the Ministère du Conseil exécutif, 1st sess., 39th Leg., Quebec (2014) [hereinafter 
“Bill 491”]. 
71  Gada Mahrouse, “‘Reasonable accommodation’ in Quebec: the limits of participation and 
dialogue” (2010) 52 Race Class 85, at 91-92. 
72 Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting 
Choice, Promoting Inclusion (December 2004), online: <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/ 
english/about/pubs/boyd/fullreport.pdf> [hereinafter “Boyd report”]. 
73 Dia Dabby, “When it comes to religious diversity in Québec, more laws do not mean 
better law” The Montreal Gazette (February 2, 2015), online: <http://montrealgazette.com/news/ 
quebec/opinion-when-it-comes-to-religious-diversity-in-quebec-more-laws-do-not-mean-better-law>;  
Bouchard & Taylor, Building the Future, supra, note 18, at 154. 
74 Liora Salter, “The Public of Public Inquiries” in Laurent Dobuzinskis, Michael Howlett 
& John Laycock, eds., Policy Analysis in Canada: The State of the Art (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2007) 291, at 311. 
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narrative of the Quebec model of values, or as put differently, “a 
discursive space for the (re)assertion of Québécois nationhood”.75  
While many of the litigated cases on religious rights have sparked 
intense and sustained public scrutiny, Multani occupies a unique 
position, pinpointed as the “starting point” for the “recognition of 
problems” related to religious reasonable accommodation. As such, 
Multani was about much more than whether a Sikh student could simply 
carry his kirpan on school premises: it marked a turning point in the 
discussion on reasonable accommodation and freedom of religion in 
Quebec.76 It introduces a new phase in the chronology put forth by the 
Bouchard-Taylor report, as the first point under the heading of “A Time 
of turmoil” (March 2006 - May 2007);77 as related by the report, “[t]he 
term accommodation entered public discourse and from then on became 
a hackneyed expression.”78 Put differently, it became the point through 
which the before/after campaign was measured in terms of religious 
accommodations in Quebec. Ironically enough, the public education 
setting in Quebec had been the only one to engage in a deep and 
sustained discussion on deconfessionalization79 prior to the Bouchard-
Taylor commission. As Pauline Côté suggests, “[a]s a public issue, laïcité 
had almost no notoriety outside the public education sector before the 
start of the reasonable accommodation controversy.”80  
Instead of focusing on what Multani did accomplish — namely, the 
Supreme Court of Canada decision engaged in an imperfect discussion 
on reasonable accommodation and built on the sense of inclusion through 
triumph of religious beliefs in the context of a schoolyard81 — the Bill 60 
hearings characterized Multani as a negative turning point in the story of 
                                                                                                                       
75 Emily Laxer, Rachel Dianne Carson & Anna C. Korteweg, “Articulating minority nationhood: 
cultural and political dimensions in Québec’s reasonable accommodation debate” (2014) 20:1 Nations and 
Nationalism 133, at 133 [hereinafter “Laxer et al., ‘Articulating minority nationhood’”]. 
76 Stoker, supra, note 24, at 816; Howard Kislowicz, “Law, Religion, and Feeling 
Included/Excluded: Case Studies in Canadian Religious Freedom Litigation” (2015)  
C.J.L.S./R.C.D.S. (forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter “Kislowicz, ‘Feeling Included/Excluded’”]; B.L. 
Berger, “Religious Diversity, Education, and the ‘Crisis’ in State Neutrality” (2014) 29 
C.J.L.S./R.C.D.S. 103, at 118. 
77 Bouchard & Taylor, Building the Future, supra, note 18, at 7. 
78 Id., at 53. 
79 Supra, note 29. 
80 Pauline Côté, “Québec and Reasonable Accommodation: Uses and Misuses of Public 
Consultations” in Lori Beaman & Peter Beyer, eds., Religious Diversity in Canada (Leiden: Brill, 
2008) 41, at 61. 
81 See Kislowicz, “Feeling Included/Excluded”, supra, note 76, at 8-10. 
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religious accommodation in Quebec. The claim of Gurbaj Singh Multani 
was no longer about an immigrant trying to fit into his classe d’accueil, 
but rather, a decision made by a “disconnected” institution, the Supreme 
Court of Canada, on how to “live together” in Quebec. 
In the PQ’s five-point plan released prior to Bill 60 (as part of their 
media campaign), 2006 is identified as the pivotal year, marking the 
“beginning” of highly mediatized cases of religious accommodation that 
caused deep unease in Quebec. Indeed, while Multani is not referenced 
explicitly by name, the time-frame, along with a reference to the works of  
the Bouchard-Taylor commission on reasonable accommodation, buttress 
the PQ’s argument that “clear rules regarding religious accommodation 
[which] would contribute to integration and social cohesion” 82  were 
needed — desperately.  
Within the debates on Bill 60 before the National Assembly, the 
Federation of Montreal School Boards (“FMSB”) argued that the 
proposed restriction on the wearing of religious symbols, and conflicts 
arising from this proposed provision, would incur substantial costs to the 
school boards, both financially and administratively.83  Returning to 
Multani, the FMSB underscored that the Marguerite-Bourgeoys school 
commission had to shoulder alone the costs associated with attempting to 
regulate the wearing of the kirpan in one of their schools, citing costs of 
over $500,000 in legal fees alone.84 Enforcing a ban on religious symbols 
by school boards (as proposed via section 5 of Bill 60) underscores a 
fundamental question as to whether this regulatory burden is simply a 
financial one, or perhaps, requires a more nuanced view of what “service 
provider” means in the context of education.85  
                                                                                                                       
82 [Translated by author]. Original, in French: « Depuis 2006, plusieurs cas d’accommodements 
religieux très médiatisés ont suscité un profond malaise au Québec. Pour préserver la paix sociale et 
favoriser l’harmonie, nous devons éviter de laisser les tensions s’accroître. Des règles claires en 
matières d’accommodement religieux contribueront à l’intégration et à la cohésion sociale. Elles 
seront bénéfiques pour tous les Québécois et Québécoises, incluant les nouveaux arrivants. Nous 
serons mieux servis par un État qui nous traite tous et toutes également. », online : <http://web. 
archive.org/web/20140328134128/http://www.nosvaleurs.gouv.qc.ca/fr> (March 28, 2014 snapshot). 
83 Quebec, National Assembly, Journal des débats, 40th Leg., 1st Sess., Vol. 43 N° 129 
(February 18, 2014), at 17h03 (Josée Bouchard). 
84 Id. The FMSB makes a similar argument regarding the costs incurred by the Commission 
scolaire des chênes in their legal case (infra, note 129), arguing that the school board had to defend 
the contested ethics and religious culture program without State assistance, despite it being a 
program put into place by the Minister of Education. 
85 Quebec, National Assembly, Journal des débats, 40th Leg., 1st Sess., Vol. 43 N° 129 
(February 18, 2014), at 17h50 (Nathalie Roy). While class time and lessons are clearly included in 
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Multani was employed as a segue way by Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, 
retired Supreme Court Justice, to pay closer attention to social context. 
She argues, in her capacity as a representative of the Juristes pour la 
laïcité et la neutralité religieuse de l’État (Jurists for secularism and 
neutrality of the State), that the decision on the kirpan marks the further 
development in legal thought on these civil freedoms — which she states 
are not absolute — and contrasts with fundamental freedoms (such as 
those to equality, right to life and a just and equitable process).86  
She underscores Bastarache J.’s dissenting opinion in Amselem and that 
of LeBel J. in S. (N.),87 to suggest that Quebec judges have a different 
voice from other judges sitting on the Supreme Court bench when it 
comes to questions of religious accommodation.88 In her opinion, one 
must take Quebec’s particular social context into account when making 
decisions about the place of religion.89 
While other persons before the National Assembly hearings invoked 
“l’affaire du kirpan” in the context of a scenario or more anecdotally,90 
the Mouvement laïque québécois (“MLQ”) contrasted Multani with a 
unanimous motion passed by the legislature, which effectively barred 
ceremonial daggers from the National Assembly. Multani is portrayed by 
the MLQ as a “bizarre” decision by the Supreme Court of Canada. On 
the other hand, the 2011 unanimous motion by the members of the  
 
                                                                                                                       
Bill 60’s understanding of “service provider”, other activities fall in a far more nebulous grey zone. 
For instance, a student is not necessarily receiving a “service” between two classes or over the lunch 
hour: as such, one could question whether the absence of a “service” could inadvertently suspend the 
duty to enforce the ban on religious symbols: see Quebec, National Assembly, Journal des débats, 
40th Leg., 1st Sess., Vol. 43 N° 129 (February 18, 2014), at 17h10 (Josée Bouchard) [translated by 
author]. Original, in French: « car un élève ne reçoit pas nécessairement un service entre deux cours 
ou sur l’heure du dîner, par exemple ». 
86 Quebec, National Assembly, Journal des débats, 40th Leg, 1st Sess, Vol. 43 N° 120 
(February 7, 2014), at 09h50 (Claire L’Heureux-Dubé). See also Juristes pour la laïcité et la 
neutralité de l’État, Mémoire présenté à la Commission des institutions, Assemblée nationale du 
Québec (December 18, 2013), online: <http://www.assnat.qc.ca/fr/travaux-parlementaires/ 
commissions/CI/mandats/Mandat-24537/memoires-deposes.html>. 
87 R. v. S. (N.), [2012] S.C.J. No. 72, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 726 [hereinafter “S. (N.)”]. 
88 Supra, note 86. 
89 Id. 
90 Quebec, National Assembly, Journal des débats, 40th Leg., 1st Sess., Vol. 43 N° 110 
(January 14, 2014); Quebec, National Assembly, Journal des débats, 40th Leg., 1st Sess., Vol. 43 
N° 115 (January 22, 2014); Quebec, National Assembly, Journal des débats, 40th Leg., 1st Sess., 
Vol. 43 N° 116 (January 23, 2014). 
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National Assembly, adopted during the hearings on Bill 94,91 — affirming 
the principle of secularism in the process — was welcomed as something 
“extraordinary”.92  
In the public discourse of Bill 60, I suggest that Multani and the 
Bouchard-Taylor report occupy an important place in the framing of 
religious accommodation. Multani is constructed as the starting point: 
anything that occurred before 2006, either in law or politics, appears 
extraneous to the debate on values and accommodation in Quebec. 
Alternately, the Bouchard-Taylor report infuses Bill 60 with a new (old) 
narrative on belonging. Regulating shared spaces and relationships 
implies a deeply shared vision of society, but also, another way to engage 
with identity politics. Building on this re-definition of vivre-ensemble in 
the key of accommodation, the next section discusses the projected scope 
of Bill 60. 
3. Scope: Nine-to-five Secularism 
This section’s objective is to provide both critiques and explanations 
of certain provisions contained in Bill 60. A precursor to this section’s 
objective is to clearly indicate Bill 60’s intent. 
Put bluntly, Bill 60 was far-reaching: it touched all public and para-
public services. It articulated an expectation of results insofar as 
maintaining religious neutrality in the exercise of their functions.93 This 
included government departments, municipalities, schools and school 
boards as well as university-level institutions, health and social services  
                                                                                                                       
91 The motion barring ceremonial daggers in the National Assembly can be found here: 
Quebec, National Assembly, Votes and Proceedings, 39th Leg., 2nd Sess., Vol. 41 N° 170 (February 9, 
2011). This motion came one month after representatives of the World Sikh Organization were 
invited to testify in favour of women with covered faces receiving services: “Kirpan banned at Que. 
national assembly” CBC (February 9, 2011), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/ 
kirpan-banned-at-que-national-assembly-1.1113333>. The Quebec Superior Court recently upheld 
the motion to ban the kirpan from the National Assembly as part and parcel of parliamentary 
privilege: Singh c. Québec (Procureur général), [2015] J.Q. no 10671. 
92 Quebec, National Assembly, Journal des débats, 40th Leg., 1st Sess., Vol. 43 N° 120 
(January 21, 2014), at 11h20 (Michel Lincourt): « Dans le cas du kirpan, le droit de religion était 
plus important que le droit à la sécurité des enfants. Et le plus bizarre dans ce cas-là, dans le cas de la 
Cour suprême, c’est que la Cour suprême permet le port du kirpan dans une école mais l’interdit 
dans les tribunaux puis l’interdit dans les avions, hein? Je veux dire, c’est… Puis tous les députés ici 
ont voté la résolution interdisant le port du kirpan dans l’enceinte de l’Assemblée nationale, n’est-ce 
pas, hein, en affirmant le principe de la laïcité. Voici, là, un vote unanime et qui a été salué par tout 
le monde comme étant quelque chose d’extraordinaire. » 
93 Bill 60, supra, note 1, s. 3. 
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agencies and public institutions, members of the National Assembly94 as 
well as persons duly named by the provincial government exercising 
judicial or adjudicative functions.95  
The “public” in Bill 60’s “public bodies” was ambitious, but also, 
contentious since it encompassed public actors who habitually benefitted 
from a certain level of state deference in the scope of their functions, 
including doctors, judges and third party partnerships. For instance, 
doctors, considered to be neither employees nor representatives of the 
State, were included in Bill 60’s purview despite being “self-employed 
workers” in employment law terms.96 Provincially appointed judges were 
also included in Bill 60’s scope, placing contentious limits on their 
judicial independence and impartiality, but also, potentially limiting 
diversity in provincial judicial and adjudicative nominations.97 Equating 
judges with those exercising adjudicative or quasi-judicial functions, as 
did Bill 60, is institutionally problematic, especially in light of the 2011 
Bastarache report on judicial nominations,98 since members of the latter 
are actually given a policy mandate.99 Bill 60’s inclusion of both types of 
                                                                                                                       
94 Bill 60, supra, note 1, s. 2 and Sch. I. Acts of civil disobedience were also noted 
following its proposal, most notably through the Jewish General Hospital’s explicit (and very 
public) refusal to apply Bill 60 if enacted into law: Marian Scott, “Civil disobedience and the 
secularism charter” Montreal Gazette (December 26, 2013), online: <http://www.montrealgazette. 
com/life/Civil+disobedience+secularism+charter/9328663/story.html>. 
95 Bill 60, supra, note 1, ss. 8, 13. Public health and social institutions were scheduled to 
benefit from a five-year transition period, substantially longer than other public bodies: Bill 60, id., 
ss. 44-46. 
96 Fédération des médecins omnipraticiens du Québec, Mémoire de la Fédération des 
médecins omnipraticiens du Québec présenté à la Commission des institutions : concernant le projet 
de loi 60 (December 2013), online: <http://www.fmoq.org/Lists/FMOQDocumentLibrary/ 
fr/Affaires%20Syndicales/Prises%20de%20position/2013-12-Memoire-Charte-FMOQ.pdf>, at 3, 5. 
97 Barreau du Québec, Projet de loi No 60, supra, note 38, at 19-23. The Barreau du Québec 
argues the impact of Bill 60 on the constitutional principle of judicial independence remains unclear; 
accordingly, the legislator must show caution in imposing restrictions or obligations on those 
exercising judicial or adjudicative functions. The Bouchard-Taylor Report recommended a “duty of 
circumspection” for members of the National Assembly, judges, crown prosecutors, police officers 
and prison guards: see Bouchard & Taylor, Building the Future, supra, note 18, at 150-51 (fn 38). 
98 Commission d’enquête sur le processus de nomination des juges de la Cour du Québec, 
des cours municipales et des membres du Tribunal administratif du Québec, Rapport (January 19, 
2011), online: <http://www.cepnj.gouv.qc.ca/rapport.html>. While the report dealt with allegations 
of political influence, the notion of the neutral judge is susbtantially addressed. See infra, note 99. 
99 This point is addressed explicitly in the context of judicial nominations in Quebec: see 
Roderick Macdonald, Parametres of Politics in Judicial Appointments (September 1, 2010) (Study 
Commissioned by the Commission of Inquiry into the Appointment Process for Judges in Quebec), 
online: <http://www.cepnj.gouv.qc.ca/etudes-des-experts.html>, at 13. In that same report, Macdonald 
questions the validity of having a neutral judiciary. 
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decision-makers would effectively — and explicitly — label them with a 
political mandate, significantly undermining judicial notions of 
independence and impartiality. Finally, Bill 60 also was extended to any 
person or partnership that has entered into a service contract or subsidy 
agreement with a public body.100 This meant, for example, that the duty 
of religious neutrality would impede publicly subsidized daycares from 
having employees who wear religious garb.101 This brief incursion into 
the scope of Bill 60 suggests that the focus on “public bodies” is central 
to Bill 60’s line of argument, since the weight of implementation rested 
squarely on the public institution’s shoulders.  
Perhaps most controversial, Bill 60 introduced obligations for all 
personnel members of the aforementioned public bodies to embrace 
“facial” neutrality in the course of providing services.102  A reciprocal 
obligation was also introduced for people receiving the aforementioned 
public services to also present themselves, faces uncovered.103  Put 
differently, faces had to be uncovered in the context of providing or 
receiving public services. Bill 60 provides little elaboration — or 
legislative guidance — on the “service receiver” side, beyond the 
obligation of an uncovered face. Focus, instead, is on the “service 
provider” side, where personnel members were to be considered natural 
and organic “extensions” of the public bodies, which “must remain 
neutral in religious matters and reflect the secular nature of the State”.104 
Non-compliance with stipulated restrictions would result in a “dialogue” 
with the public body, before resulting in disciplinary measures  
(if subsequent infraction), metered out by said public body.105 As such, 
when present on work grounds (and in the exercise of their functions), no 
personnel member could have prominent religious symbols — this meant 
that one would have to put away their hijab, take off their turban, and 
                                                                                                                       
100 Bill 60, supra, note 1, s. 10. 
101 Id., note 1, ss. 27-31. See also: Association des garderies privées du Québec, Mémoire sur 
le projet de loi 60 (December 19, 2013), online: <http://www.assnat.qc.ca/fr/travaux-parlementaires/ 
commissions/CI/mandats/Mandat-24537/memoires-deposes.html>, at 3-4. For a discussion on an 
earlier directive banning religious instruction in publicly subsidized daycares in Quebec (known as 
“CPEs”) in 2010, see Shauna Van Praagh, “‘Inside Out/Outside In’: Coexistence and Cross-
Pollination of Religion and State” in René Provost, ed., Mapping the Legal Boundaries of 
Belonging: Religion and Multiculturalism from Israel to Canada (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), at 121-42. 
102 Bill 60, supra, note 1, ss. 3-6. 
103 Id., ss. 7, 22. 
104 Id., ss. 1-4. 
105 Id., s. 14. 
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remove their kippa. Some have referred to this as the duty of “reasonable 
sacrifice” by personnel members.106 Put differently, or bureaucratically, 
this required a nine-to-five secularism: no restrictions were made to 
employees in their off-hours or their private lives, except as service 
receivers.  
The pictogram released as part of Bill 60’s wide media campaign, 
illustrated the permissible and prohibited proclamations of faith.107 As 
such, a small cross, Star of David ring or crescent moon earrings were 
considered “inconspicuous” religious symbols of faith for personnel 
members in the course of their duties. On the other hand, “obtrusive” 
religious symbols included the hijab, burka, kippa, turban and oversized 
cross. Less clear, however, were situations of “facial neutrality” for 
personnel members beyond those wearing the hijab (the niqab and burka 
were considered implicitly part of the hijab range of coverings). 
Consider, for instance, women wearing other kinds of “coverings”, such 
as a Hassidic woman’s wig (or women or men who might be wearing 
wigs for other reasons);108 or an Indian woman’s pallu (long end of the 
sari). One could also reflect upon men sporting beards as part of their 
religious beliefs, which include Sikhs, Jews and Muslims, 109  amongst 
others. None of the aforementioned situations are adequately addressed 
in the legislative provisions, or via the debates before the National 
Assembly. These situations also suggest that ethnicity and/or cultural 
heritage (such as the pallu, for instance) can be weaved into the debates 
over religious faith. These signs of omission reify the range of 
“acceptable” and “unacceptable” voices and symbols in this most recent 
                                                                                                                       
106 The duty of “reasonable sacrifice” (sacrifice raisonnable) refers to a curtailing of 
religious freedom while on work premises, but not in one’s private sphere of life and belief. See  
« 60 chercheurs universitaires pour la laïcité, contre le projet de Loi 60 », Mémoire présenté à la 
Commission des institutions siégeant en janvier 2014 (December 20, 2013), online: <http://www. 
lecre.umontreal.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Le-mémoire-60-chercheurs-universitaires-pour-la- 
laïcité-contre-le-projet-de-loi-60.pdf>, at 18-21.  
107 Philip Authier, “Quebec releases controversial ‘values charter’, proposes that anyone 
giving, receiving public services would need faces uncovered”, National Post (September 13, 2013), 
online: <http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/quebec-releases-controversial-values-charter-says-
anyone-giving-receiving-public-services-needs-face-uncovered#__federated=1>. 
108 Richard Moon also discusses the place of wigs and Bill 60 in Freedom of Conscience and 
Religion (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2014), at 120-21. Within broader discussions on secularism, it has 
been noted that the headscarf ban in Turkey has been extended to employees who replace their 
headscarf with a wig: see Amélie Barras, Refashioning Secularism in France and in Turkey: The 
Case of the Headscarf Ban (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014), at 49. 
109 The beard, as a religious expression of faith, has been endorsed by the United States 
Supreme Court in the context of a Muslim prisoner. See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. ___ (2015). 
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debate on religious accommodation. This article argues, however, that 
the concession of “unobtrusive” symbols simply reproduces how religion 
was thought of as being private, wearable and entirely removable. Put 
differently, it revealed a desire by the State for minority religions to 
replicate Christian symbols of faith, crafting at once secular and religious 
representations. Most notably, the illustration of the crescent moon 
earrings in the Bill 60 pictogram, as an illustration of Muslim faith, 
underscores the symbolic (and somewhat confused) understanding of 
religion and nature of religious symbols that is entertained in this 
context.110  
More fundamentally, this compromise on “unobtrusive” symbols 
unveiled — no pun intended — the “cultural transformation of religious 
symbols […] allow[ing] for the preservation of a majority religious 
hegemony in the name of culture”.111 This transformation of religion to 
culture, while beyond the scope of this article, also finds credence in the 
opening of Bill 60, which allows for the recognition of “emblematic and 
toponymic elements of Québec’s cultural heritage that testify to its 
history”.112 In the first day of hearings before the National Assembly, 
Bernard Drainville explains his interpretation of the opening of Bill 60 to 
his interlocutor. During this exchange, he explicitly acknowledged that 
Christian iconography, prevalent in the Quebec landscape, would retain a 
preferential (one can read now cultural) place: “That is what led me to 
say that crosses, like the cross on the Mount-Royal, the wayside crosses, 
the references to saints in the Quebec landscape, would be protected with 
the Charter [Bill 60].”113  In nine-to-five secularism, majority culture 
takes precedence over minority religions; these power relations are also 
replayed in the context of the precarious frameworks of accommodation 
envisioned by Bill 60, as addressed in the next section. 
                                                                                                                       
110 Symbolic representations of religion have been suggested elsewhere as an alternative to 
“conspicuous” religious symbols: in Multani, an initial suggestion of compromise, in lieu of an 
actual sheathed ceremonial dagger, was a symbolic one, worn as a pendant (Multani, supra, note 8, 
at para. 5). This has also been used in France following the Stasi report by then president Jacques 
Chirac, who suggested that a hand of Fatima could be worn instead of the veil. See Amélie Barras & 
Dia Dabby, “Only Skin Deep? Revising the Secular Narrative through Circumcision?” in Heather 
Shipley, ed., Globalized Religion and Sexuality (Leiden: Brill, 2014) 86, at 92 (fn 12). 
111 Beaman, “Battle over symbols”, supra, note 67, at 68. 
112 Bill 60, supra, note 1, s. 1. 
113 Quebec, National Assembly, Journal des débats, 40th Leg., 1st Sess., Vol. 43 No. 110 
(January 14 2014), at 12h20 (Bernard Drainville) [translated by author]. Original, in French: “C’est 
ce qui m’a amené à dire que les croix comme la croix du Mont-Royal, les croix du chemin, les 
références aux saints dans le paysage québécois allaient être protégées avec la charte.” 
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4. Precarious Frameworks of Accommodation 
This section focuses on the frameworks of accommodation 
engendered through Bill 60. I explore how accommodation is formulated 
through the provisions set out in Chapter V of Bill 60 (i.e., ss. 15-18), as 
well as the effects of the Bill’s preamble and proportionality mechanism 
on the Quebec Charter. As such, I discuss the disparate frameworks of 
accommodation, normative additions to the preambles and the 
unbalancing of the proportionality test found in Bill 60. Indeed, in spite 
of robust case law on reasonable accommodation in Canada,114 Bill 60 
involved a new analytical framework to manage religious requests.115 
The consequences of this approach to reasonable accommodation were 
twofold. First, Bill 60 effectively disassociated Quebec from an ongoing 
pan-Canadian jurisprudential conversation on reasonable accommodation. 
Second, while the bill set out accommodation structures on religious 
requests, it was implacable with regards to accommodation of religious 
symbols,116 effectively curtailing the right to freedom of religion. Indeed, 
although Bill 60 did not explicitly modify the protection of freedom of 
religion in the Quebec Charter,117 Bill 60’s accommodation frameworks 
and imposed duties of religious neutrality, would have made it practically 
impossible to respect. Where accommodation of religious requests were 
feasible — and therefore did not concern the duties of “facial neutrality” — 
Bill 60 would have created an unwieldy multiplicity of accommodation 
frameworks, since each institution, or public body, was responsible for 
developing their own implementation policy, consistent with their “own 
mission and characteristics”.118 This denotes a further consequence to 
Bill 60’s accommodation structures; namely, promoting contradictory 
                                                                                                                       
114 Including: Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. 
No. 74, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 (S.C.C.); Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights 
Commission), [1990] S.C.J. No. 80, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489 (S.C.C.); Commission scolaire régionale de 
Chambly v. Bergevin, [1994] S.C.J. No. 57, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 525 (S.C.C.); Eldridge v. British 
Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No. 86, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.); British Columbia 
(Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. B.C.G.S.E.U., [1999] S.C.J. No. 46, [1999] 3 
S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.); Multani, supra, note 8; Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] 
S.C.J. No. 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 (S.C.C.). 
115 Bill 60, supra, note 1, ss. 15-17. 
116 Id., s. 18. 
117 Quebec Charter, supra, note 9, s. 3. For a broader discussion of this aspect of Bill 60 and  
s. 2(a) of the Charter, see Katherine Kaufman, Conflicting Identities: Québec Secularism and the 
Promise of Freedom of Religion in Canada (London School of Economics, M. Sc., 2014) [unpublished, 
on file with the author]. 
118 Bill 60, supra, note 1, ss. 19-26. 
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locations (centralized and decentralized) for institutional decision-making. 
Within the network of health establishments, for instance, this would have 
resulted in a dizzying array of administrative structures for medical 
residents who frequently change institutions within the framework of their 
medical training and specialization. 119  By contrast, within the school 
system, accommodation decisions would have been left in the hands of the 
school boards, rather than the individual schools,120 which, it is suggested, 
would leave little room to reflect the diverse school bodies. Building  
on the identified consequences of Bill 60’s analytical framework of 
reasonable accommodation, this section focuses specifically on its effects 
on the Quebec Charter’s accommodation provisions, the preamble and its 
proportionality mechanism.  
Bill 60 would have hampered the scope of rights and freedoms for 
the first time since the Quebec Charter was adopted,121  through the 
entrenchment of state secularism, gender equality and the elaboration of 
a definitive framework for religious accommodations in that same Quebec 
Charter. The Quebec Charter, understood as a quasi-constitutional 
document in Quebec, has precedence over all other laws, except when 
explicitly stated.122 It functions both as a bill of rights and a human rights 
code and also regulates private relationships between persons: it is a 
unique document in the Canadian legal landscape. The proposed 
amendments in Bill 60 would have amended and altered the Quebec 
Charter’s basic vocation as a tool of protection in Quebec society. 
Three types of preambles are usually recognized within 
constitutional documents, according to Liav Orgad: ceremonial-symbolic 
(with/without persuasive force and non-legally binding), interpretive 
(acts as a blueprint) and substantive (legally binding and enforceable).123 
In the context of Bill 60, more text would have added to the preamble of  
 
                                                                                                                       
119 Fédération des médecins résidents du Québec, Mémoire de la Fédération des médecins 
résidents du Québec : Projet de loi no 60 (December 18, 2013), online: <http://www.assnat.qc.ca/ 
fr/travaux-parlementaires/commissions/CI/mandats/Mandat-24537/memoires-deposes.html>, at 3. 
120 Bill 60, supra, note 1, s. 17. 
121 Quebec Charter, supra, note 9, as cited by Commission des droit de la personne et des 
droits de la jeunesse, Summary: Brief to the National Assembly Commission on Institutions — Bill 60 
(February 2014, Cat.2. 113-2.12.1), online: <http://www.cdpdj.qc.ca/Publications/memoire-
resume_PL_60_charte_valeurs_EN.pdf>, at 1 [hereinafter “CDPDJ, Bill 60 Brief”]. 
122 André Tremblay, Droit constitutionnel, 2d ed. (Montreal: Éditions Thémis, 2000), at 370. 
123 Liav Orgad, “The Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation” (2010) 8 I-CON 714, at 722-31 
[hereinafter “Orgad, ‘The Preamble’”]. 
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the Quebec Charter, a quasi-constitutional document, to explicitly protect 
the primacy of the French language, gender equality and state 
secularism.124 Understood through Orgad’s typology of preambles, this 
article argues that Bill 60’s amendments would have added substantive 
content to the preamble through concrete garantees rather than societal 
aspirations. This shift would have occurred through the inclusion of 
“source of sovereignty” (“Quebec nation”), “national identity” (“primacy 
of the French language”) as well as “religion” (“separation of religions 
and State and the religious neutrality and secular nature of the State”) 
into the preamble,125 which had been considered, until now, “ceremonial-
symbolic” in nature. In focusing on crafting a historical narrative and 
curating a national, sovereign identity, the additions to the preamble 
would arguably have had a “disintegrative” effect, “driving people apart 
and contributing to social tension. This occurs when a preamble reflects 
only the story of a dominant group”.126  
Perhaps most damaging to the structure of the Quebec Charter was 
the modifications to the proportionality test, which would have resulted 
in irreparable prejudice and disrupted the very mechanism responsible 
for ensuring a just balancing of rights. Indeed, the derogation provision, 
contained in the Quebec Charter, would have enforced Bill 60’s new 
reading of rights,127 including its new proportionality test. Redirecting 
proportionality analysis in such a manner would have unequivocally 
transformed the nature of the social contract that Quebecers had 
                                                                                                                       
124 Bill 60, supra, note 1, s. 40 : “The preamble to the Charter of human rights and freedoms 
(chapter C-12) is amended by inserting the following paragraph after the fourth paragraph: ‘Whereas 
equality between women and men and the primacy of the French language as well as the separation 
of religions and State and the religious neutrality and secular nature of the State are fundamental 
values of the Quebec nation;’.” It should be noted that the third paragraph of the Quebec Charter 
already protects gender equality explicitly. 
125 Id., 716-18. The discussion of the supremacy of God and rule of law in the preamble of 
the Canadian Charter, supra, note 10, has been the subject of further academic scrutiny. See, for 
instance: Lorne Sossin, “The ‘Supremacy of God’, Human Dignity and the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms” (2003) 52 U.N.B. L.J. 223; David M. Brown, “Freedom from or Freedom for? Religion 
as a Case Study in Defining the Content of Charter Rights” (2000) 33 U.B.C. L. Rev. 551; Jonathon 
Penney & Robert J. Danay, “The Embarassing Preamble? Understanding the Supremacy of God and 
the Charter (2006) 39 U.B.C. L. Rev. 287; Orgad, “The Preamble”, supra, note 124, at 723. 
126 Orgad, “The Preamble”, supra, note 123, at 731. 
127 Bill 60, supra, note 1, s. 41; Quebec Charter, supra, note 9, s. 52. Section 52 bears 
reproduction here in full: “No provision of any Act, even subsequent to the Charter, may derogate 
from sections 1 to 38, except so far as provided by those sections, unless such Act expressly states 
that it applies despite the Charter.” 
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entertained, until now, with the rest of Canada. The revised (proposed 
additions in italics) proportionality test bears reproduction in full here: 
In exercising his fundamental freedoms and rights, a person shall 
maintain a proper regard for democratic values, public order and the 
general well-being of the citizens of Québec. In exercising those 
freedoms and rights, a person shall also maintain a proper regard for 
the values of equality between women and men and the primacy of the 
French language, as well as the separation of religions and State and 
the religious neutrality and secular nature of the State, while making 
allowance for the emblematic and toponymic elements of Quebec’s 
cultural heritage that testify to its history. 
In this respect, the scope of the freedoms and rights, and limits to their 
exercise, may be fixed by law.128 
As such, section 9.1 of the Quebec Charter, understood as “the 
analog to section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”,129 
would have been seriously distorted by the addition of the italicized text. 
The inclusion of gender equality here amounts to a problematic 
redundancy: gender equality already benefits from explicit protection 
under the preamble, anti-discrimination provisions130 as well as a 2008 
law that inserted an unequivocal guarantee of gender equality in the 
Quebec Charter.131 Its addition here would “in effect create an imbalance 
that would be contrary to the Charter of Human Rights and 
Freedoms”.132 Similar concerns can also be raised about the inclusion of 
the primacy of the French language, since it would have unravelled equal 
protection accorded on the basis of language, as well as the right to 
express oneself in the language of one’s choice.133 As the Commission 
des droits de la personne et droit de la jeunesse argues in their brief 
submitted to the National Assembly on Bill 60, including “primacy” 
would necessary lead to a hierarchical understanding of rights, which 
would distort the “structure and purpose of the Charter of Human Rights 
                                                                                                                       
128 Bill 60, supra, note 1, s. 41. 
129 Choudhry, “Special Issue”, supra, note 40, at para. 28; Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Québec 
(Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at 980 (S.C.C.); Ford v. Quebec 
(Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, at 779-81 (S.C.C.); Saguenay, supra, 
note 46, at para. 90. 
130 Quebec Charter, supra, note 9, at preamble, ss. 10, 50.1. 
131 An Act to amend the Charter of human rights and freedoms, S.Q. 2008, c. 15, s. 2. 
132 CDPDJ, Bill 60 Brief, supra, note 121, at 4. 
133 Quebec Charter, supra, note 9, at s. 10. 
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and Freedoms”;134 In unpacking this amendment further, the inclusions 
reveal themselves to be even more perplexing. Consider, then:  
(1) “separation of religion and the State”;  
(2) “religious neutrality and the secular nature of the State”; and  
(3) the “emblematic and toponymic elements of Quebec’s cultural 
heritage that testify to its history”.135  
The first two points introduce a principle — state secularism — that 
does not find legal footing, either in the Quebec Charter or the Canadian 
Charter.136 More pointedly, this article suggests that Bill 60, an ordinary 
piece of legislation, attempted to displace existing constitutional 
principles and enshrine a new constitutional principle, that of state 
secularism. The final proposed addition to section 9.1 of the Quebec 
Charter reads like a legislative laundry list, articulated awkwardly, in an 
effort to protect Quebec’s cultural patrimony, as discussed previously. Its 
reference to “making allowances for its emblematic and toponymic 
elements” arguably invites a discretionary approach to balancing 
fundamental rights and freedoms under the Quebec Charter, which 
contradicts the intended purpose and scope of proportionality tests. 
Furthermore, these last amendments to the Quebec Charter would have 
undone the resemblance that the proportionality test would have had with 
its federal counterpart,137 both on a structural, but also foundational, plane. 
The long arm of the law, as explored through Bill 60’s proposed 
provisions, reveals a myopic approach to vivre-ensemble, opening the 
door to various constitutional mesaventures. Re-working Quebec’s brand 
of vivre-ensemble through Bill 60 would also impact how Quebecers 
“live together” with the rest of Canada, but also, how Quebecers “live 
together” with each other. The inclusions, redundancies and incoherencies 
make this legislative project particularly difficult to envisage in everyday 
life, or its effect in everyday law.138 Furthermore, the PQ government 
was willing to go to bat for Bill 60, going as far as saying they would 
invoke the notwithstanding clause, if necessary, to carry out their 
                                                                                                                       
134 CDPDJ, Bill 60 Brief, supra, note 121, at 4. 
135 Bill 60, supra, note 1, s. 41. 
136 As underscored in Saguenay, supra, note 46, at para. 71, the duty of religious neutrality 
results from an evolving interpretation of freedom of religion and conscience. 
137 Supra, note 129. 
138 Roderick A. Macdonald, Lessons of Everyday Law (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2002). 
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legislative project.139 Use of the notwithstanding clause, often understood 
as a point of no return, both politically and legally, holds heavy 
symbolism in the discussion on Bill 60’s constitutional intervention. 
Proposed legislative choices suggest, therefore, a serious attempt at 
reframing Quebecers’ relationships in the Canadian constitutional 
context.  
III. CONCLUSION 
“All happy families are happy alike; all unhappy families are unhappy 
in their own way.”140 
“I believe, and I think most Canadians believe that it is offensive that 
someone would hide their identity at the very moment where they are 
committing to join the Canadian family.”141 
Families are rarely straightforward, less so their internal politics; 
there are usually a few eccentric uncles hiding away and private feuds 
that make no sense to outsiders. Families also carry their particular code 
of belonging with them (“values”), which may or may not resonate with 
interlopers. By way of conclusion, this Part considers the idea of these 
“black sheep” in the context of the Canadian constitutional family. As 
elaborated in the earlier Parts of this article, Bill 60, as a secularism 
project, had a broad scope, but provided a focused outlet for the continuation 
of language and identity politics. Through a detailed examination of Bill 60, 
I exposed several inconsistencies and constitutional flaws in the 
proposed textual provisions, which suggested a disconnection of the 
proportionality test from its federal counterpart, and an embedded 
hierarchy of rights and values. Moreover, in investigating the sources of 
authority on which the PQ relied to shape their legislative project, most 
                                                                                                                       
139 As indicated in news reports before the 2014 provincial election: Canadian Press, 
“Marois would use notwithstanding clause to ensure charter of values’ survival” (March 31, 2014), 
online: <http://globalnews.ca/news/1241139/marois-would-use-notwithstanding-clause-to-ensure-
charter-of-values-survival/>. 
140 Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, translated by Louise & Aylmer Maude (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995) at 1, as cited by Roderick Macdonald in “Pluralistic Human Rights? 
Universal Human Wrongs?” in René Provost & Colleen Sheppard, eds., Dialogues on Human Rights 
and Legal Pluralism (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013) 15, at 16. 
141 Former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, as cited in Morgan Lowrie, “Harper  
says Ottawa will appeal ruling allowing veil during citizenship oath”, The Globe and Mail  
(February 12, 2015), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/harper-says-ottawa-
will-appeal-ruling-allowing-veil-during-citizenship-oath/article22979142/>. 
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notably the Bouchard-Taylor report, I showed that the legislative 
hearings on Bill 60 pointed to Multani as the watershed moment in 
“accommodation politics” in Quebec, further reinforcing the public’s 
discontent with a Supreme Court decision (Part II). The quotes at the 
outset of this article by Drainville and Marois — Bill 60 as marshalling 
Quebecers much like the French language debates of the 1980s — 
illustrate this argument, where language is inextricably linked with state 
secularism in order to defend their broader project for “all” Quebecers.142 
As observed by some, “the difficulty in defining these cultural 
characteristics, and specifying their relationship to state power, continues 
to be productive of (re)articulations of Québec national identity.”143 
Interwoven into these exercises of politics (identity, language) is a deeper 
discourse, that of Quebec as continual “outlier” to the Canadian 
constitutional family: the exercise of isolation through law (redefining 
the duties of accommodation and restricting appeals to proportionality) 
as well as resurgence of Quebec identity through the Bouchard-Taylor 
commission144 and Multani, could serve to distinguish Quebec’s legal 
positioning. This uncle does not want to sit down at the family table.  
However, this article suggests that recent litigation in the RoC 
critically challenges Quebec’s stance of requiring a differential attitude 
and legal cadre for managing religious diversity. Indeed, cases involving 
niqabs in courtroom testimony and citizenship ceremonies145 underscore 
                                                                                                                       
142 Drawing on commonalities (language, values) can also reveal embedded social 
hierarchies: see Sirma Bilge, “Reading the Racial Subtext of the Québécois Accommodation 
Controversy: An Analytics of Racialized Governmentality” (2013) 40:1 Politikon 157, at 158: “this 
tacit common language, together with unarticulated shared assumptions and entitlements upon which 
it relies, is racially structured, shaped by the dominant racial formation in Québec and oriented by its 
white habitus.” 
143 Laxer et al., “Articulating minority nationhood”, supra, note 75, at 139. 
144 Id., at 134. 
145 S. (N.), supra, note 87; Ishaq v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 
[2015] F.C.J. No. 158, 2015 FC 156 (F.C.), affd [2015] F.C.J. No. 1071, 2015 FCA 194 (F.C.A.) 
[hereinafter “Ishaq”]. The socio-legal fall-out of the Ishaq decision is beyond the scope of this article 
and consequently, not addressed here.  
 For a discussion on religious diversity in Canada and the recent tribulations involving the 
niqab in particular, see, for example: Trevor C.W. Farrow, “Re-Framing the Sharia Arbitration 
Debate” (2006) 15:2 Const. Forum 79, 81; Beaman, “It was all slightly unreal”, supra, note 70; 
Narain, “Taking the Culture out”, supra, note 70; Natasha Bakht, “In Your Face: Piercing the Veil of 
Ignorance about Niqab-Wearing Women” (2014) 24(3) Social & Legal Studies 419; Faisal Bhabha, 
“R. v. NS: What’s Fair in a Trial? The Supreme Court of Canada’s Divided Decision on the Niqab in 
the Courtroom” (2014) 50 Alta. L. Rev. 871; Lori Chambers & Jen Roth, “Prejudice Unveiled: The 
Niqab in Court” (2014) 29 C.J.L.S./R.C.D.S. 381; Fathima Cader, “Made you look: Niqabs, the 
Muslim Canadian Congress, and R. v. N.S.” (2013) 31 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 67; Canadian 
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that it is the lawfulness of the laws that are challenged. In this context, 
like that of Quebec, civic inclusion is misconceived as acquiescence to 
all law and not merely obedience to lawful law.146 Moreover, ongoing 
litigation over the accreditation of a proposed faith-based law school147 
challenges the place and purpose of law schools and their graduates as 
actors in, and agents of, the legal system.148 The notions of both “service 
providers” and “service receivers”, to borrow from Bill 60, are as 
contested in recent Canadian litigation on religious diversity. These cases 
suggest that a more nuanced view of how religion is managed in149 and 
outside Quebec is needed.150  
Bill 60 enabled the PQ to redefine their political project, sovereignty, in 
terms that resonate in today’s society in Quebec, namely through 
institutional design.151 This article suggests that in shifting the focus from 
language to culture/religion/race, Bill 60 attempted to reshape the way in 
which Quebecers conceive of their relationship with each other, as well as 
with the rest of the country. It is also submitted that the language used — 
now of religion, culture and to a more subtle extent, race — also resonate in 
                                                                                                                       
Council of Muslim Women, Women in Niqab Speak: A Study of the Niqab in Canada (2013), online: 
<http://ccmw.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/WEB_EN_WiNiqab_FINAL.pdf>. 
146 See, in this way: B.L. Berger, “Belonging to Law: Religious Difference, Secularism and 
the Conditions of Civic Inclusion” (2014) 24:1 Social & Legal Studies 47, at 55: “obedience to the 
law c[omes] to serve as a diagnostic for civic inclusion.” 
147 Trinity Western University v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2015] O.J. No. 3492, 2015 
ONSC 4250 (Ont. Div. Ct.); Trinity Western University v. Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, [2015] 
N.S.J. No. 32, 2015 NSSC 25 (N.S.S.C.). 
148 See, for example: Alice Wooley, “Equality Rights, Freedom of Religion and the Training 
of Canadian Lawyers” (2014) 17 Legal Ethics 437; Elaine Craig, “TWU: A Reply to Proponents of 
Approval” (2014) 37 Dalhousie L.J. 621; Dwight G. Newman, “On the Trinity Western University 
Controversy: An Argument for a Christian Law School in Canada” (2013) 22:3 Const. Forum 1; 
Elaine Craig, “The Case for the Federation of Law Societies Rejecting Trinity Western University’s 
Proposed Law Degree Program” (2013) 25 C.J.W.L. 148; Howard Kislowicz, “Book Review: Free 
to Believe: Rethinking Freedom of Conscience and Religion in Canada, by Mary Anne Waldron” 
(2015) 52 Osgoode Hall L.J. 303, at 307 (fn 22). 
149 This point is further butressed in light of recent Supreme Court decisions from Quebec, 
namely Loyola, supra, note 45 and Saguenay, supra, note 46. 
150 A poll conducted in Canada in September 2013 on the proposed Quebec charter of values 
received mixed support: “[m]ore than two-thirds of respondents to an Angus-Reid poll […] would 
ban kirpans; almost as many would prohibit public servants from wearing burqas.”: Anna Mehler 
Paperny, “Poll: Rest of Canada decries Quebec’s charter, but opposes some religious symbols” 
Global News (September 11, 2013), online: <http://globalnews.ca/news/834241/poll-rest-of-canada-
decries-quebecs-charter-but-opposes-some-religious-symbols/>. 
151 Roderick Macdonald made this argument about constitution making in Canada and 
political membership. See “Three Centuries of Constitution Making in Canada: Will there be a 
Fourth?” (1996) 30 U.B.C. L. Rev. 211, at 216 [hereinafter “Macdonald, ‘Three Centuries’”]. 
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the discussions in the RoC on this subject; as such, on a close examination, 
Quebec’s construction as constitutional “outlier” starts to wane. 
In this article, I have engaged with Bill 60 and the broader 
phenomenon of identity politics and constitutional relationships in 
Canada. I have argued that Bill 60 revealed a legislative project that went 
far beyond a simple law. Bill 60 was a constitutional intervention by 
another name. Reliance on legislative action, rather than on strategic 
litigation and subsequent judicial action, has been deeply characteristic 
of Quebec politics and movements for social change and thus should 
come as no surprise that law reform was the PQ’s vehicle of choice.152 
While the dust is still settling around this proposed bill, its failure can 
likely be linked to its politics of estrangement — the “divide and conquer” 
stratagem — not on the basis of sovereignty through language, but rather, 
through the framing of accommodation through religion. Nevertheless, the 
PLQ, currently in power in Quebec, has brought the regulation of religious 
accommodation back into the public sphere in the closing days of the 
spring 2015 legislative session.153  As eloquently stated by one author, 
“[l]aw reform rarely provides the solutions to the social problems that the 
law is trying to regulate. It usually only solves problems by giving ongoing 
social problems a new expression and a new form.”154 
                                                                                                                       
152 The feminist movement in Quebec in the early 1970s favoured legislative transformation 
and the redefinition of women’s everyday power; this approach differed from the rest of Canada, 
where legal action was chosen as privileged place for redefining women’s status: Jennifer Stoddart, 
« Des lois et des droits. Considérations à propos d’un cheminement distinct » (1995) 36:1 Les 
Cahiers de droit 9, at 11. Thanks to Colleen Sheppard for bringing this point to my attention. 
153 It is beyond the scope of this article to engage with the content and particularities of this 
legislative project: see Bill 62, An Act to foster adherence to State religious neutrality and, in 
particular, to provide a framework for religious accommodation requests in certain bodies, 1st sess., 
41st Leg., Quebec, 2015. 
154 Macdonald, “Three Centuries”, supra, note 151. 
 
